A Judicial Fable?

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Ashcroft Burnham
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Post by Ashcroft Burnham »

[quote="Beathan":wga5s2sc]You are right that I have not yet agreed with you, or worked out a consensus with you, about the Judiciary Act. This is for two reasons. First, the Judiciary Act is so horribly, hopelessly flawed in its current details and implementation that it cannot be accepted without major revision, even rewriting. Second, you are demanding acceptance of it and are unwilling to engage in constructive conversation aimed at changing the Act to address its flaws and improve it. Your first and last instinct seems to be to refute counterargument, rather than work toward a compromise -- and you tend to accept revision only under duress.

Synthesis by consensus is not possbile if either party refuses to engage in a full and fair effort to compromise. Compromise is impossible if the parties hold irreconcilable positions. To be charitable to you, I will assume (despite some contrary evidence) that our positions are irreconcilable rather than that you are hopelessly obtuse and pigheaded. Personally, however, I believe that I can only be considered pigheaded in the context of my debate with you -- I have shown far more flexibility and a greater willingness to compromise in other debates, even in related debates with other people. Perhaps this means that I have a particular and lamentable inability to deal with you, Ash, productively -- but perhaps the fault, dear Caesar, lies not in your stars, but in yourself.

I have had fruitful synthetic discussions with Diderot, Jon, Pel, Moon, Gwyn -- even Oni and Michel. I have found real insight in posts of all these people -- and in your posts as well (although I have not found the insight I see in your posts to comport with your conclusions -- or support the details of your project).[/quote:wga5s2sc]

Beathan, one of my main problems with the way in which you (and other) people address debates on these forums is well encapsulated in this particular thread.

You start with a very strongly critical claim of my position (and, by implication, me personally, since it amounts necessarily to an accusation of intellectual dishonesty) by claiming, in essence, that, because I have not given in and agreed with anyone else about one single thing to do with the judiciary is "worrying" and indicates that I hold the beliefs that I do, not for genuine reasons at all, but "prejudices and biases": "passions disguised as reasons"; from that, you conclude that by "refuting rather than accommodating" counter-argument, the way in which I have engaged in debate has been other than "full and fair".

Perhaps not surprisingly, I have sought to defend myself against the criticism that I hold my positions irrationally, am intellectually dishonest, and that I debate unfairly: they are very serious accusations, after all. To do that, I make a careful, reasoned argument against your reasoning (that, from the premise that I have not, in fact, agreed with anyone's arguments about the judiciary, it necessarily follows that I either have a "deficiency in imagination" or that I am so arrogant that I do not even bother to try to understand what other people are writing when they are disagreeing) by pointing out two things, namely (1) that the premise is flawed: there have been occasions when I have changed my position in relation to the judiciary, and (2) that, in any event, even given the premise, the conclusion that you draw is not entailed by it, since there are other possibilities (which I enumerate).

One (but not the only) of those enumerated possibilities is that I am indeed right about all of the things to do with the judiciary that have so far been debated, and that I have not given into the counterarguments because I can see that they are wrong. I also, in passing, pointed out that I had not recalled any point at which [i:wga5s2sc]you[/i:wga5s2sc] had given into counterargument in relation to any position of principle that you had adopted in relation to any aspect of the debate in relation to the judiciary, the implications of which are either (1) that you, too, either suffer from a defect of imagination or are overwhelmingly arrogant; or (2) that you do not suffer from a defect of imagination or from overwhelming arrogance, and therefore that it does not necessarily follow that anybody who does not give in to positions in relation to arguments about the judiciary that either of those things must be true.

Bearing in mind the intensity of the personal criticism of me with which you started, and to which I was responding, your only reply to all of that argument is what you have written above, the rest of the post being devoted to the place of reason, rights, procedure, and some campaigning for the Simplicity Party (which I shall address below).

What you write above effectively amounts to, "of course I have not given in on any of my positions in relation to the judiciary because all the arguments presented by you and the others who favour the judiciary are wrong (and therefore my counter-arguments are right) because our present judiciary is so awful. I've given in about unspecified other things, though". So, not only do you fail entirely to address expressly any of the points that I made in contradicting your claims that I was irrational, intellectually dishonest, arrogant and/or suffering from a "defect in imagination", but you reply to one of my counter-arguments to your claims with something that, given the reasoning that I have explained above, entails that you are in exactly the same position as am I: claiming that all of the criticisms made of all of the positions that you have taken in relation to the judiciary are right, and that all of your opponents to those positions are wrong. We are then left with a position where you start by criticising me for doing something (not giving in), I reply to that by explaining in detail why it is not a valid criticism, and point out that you have not given in, and your only reply to all of that is to seek to justify why you have not given in.

So, you do not acknowledge that you were wrong to claim that I was either immensely arrogant or suffering from a defect of imagination, or that I am intellectually dishonest, or irrational, or that what I claim are reasons are actually biases and prejudices, nor do you provide any counter-argument to show why, contrary to what I have written, your position that I am immensely arrogant and/or suffering from a defect of imagination, intellectually dishonest and irrational, is indeed defensible: you just entirely ignore it. You have also not, despite an explicit request from me, given any sort of reasoned argument to show the basis for your again very serious accusation that I have been somehow unfair in the way in which I have been engaging in debate.

The entire exchange can be surmised as follows:

Beathan: "You've never agreed with any of your opponents about the judiciary, so you must be wrong (and a little insane, too)"

Ashcroft: "Actually, I have agreed with some of my opponents, and the fact that I haven't agreed can't mean that I'm wrong or insane by itself, and, anyway, you haven't agreed with any of your opponents about the judiciary, either".

Beathan: "Ahh, but I haven't agreed with my opponents because they're wrong and I'm right".

Now, forgive me if I think that that is not a full and fair debate on your behalf.

Incidentally, like you, I have changed my position on things other than matters relating to the judiciary more than on things relating to the judiciary, too: before the Judiciary Act was passed, there was a great debate about what sort of [i:wga5s2sc]executive[/i:wga5s2sc] to have. I was involved in that debate, too, and proposed a model, including legislation, for a directly elected executive for each sim: a Burgermeister for Neufreistadt, and a Prerator for Colonia Nova, etc. I drafted a Bill specifically on that topic (with some gaps left to be filled in before it was passed, such as what voting system to use), which was then debated by the then only two factions. Eventually, it was agreed by the factions that there should be a single, overall Chancellor of the CDS, rather than local executives, and that the Chancellor should be appointed by the legislature, not directly elected. That was passed by the RA, and I saw no use in commenting on it further or trying to reverse the position (even though at the time, I preferred my original model) because the elected representatives had already made their decision, the matter was settled, and it was time to move on. Then, when the Chancellor was appointed, and I saw the results of the system in practice (i.e., things working far more efficiently before), and realised that having a single, overall Chancellor of the CDS is, indeed, a better model than having local executives because of the efficiency that is obtained by having a single, central point of contact for the whole CDS, and because it is less labour-intensive and there is less duplication of function.

I have tended to confine my energies to things that I think are particularly important and, like you, have considered the judiciary of the highest importance, and have therefore focussed almost exclusively on that when I have posted of late because of the problems that there have been and the need to defend the system from detractors.

In relation to the point that I have spent a great deal of words explaining above, it is the sort of point that I normally address by writing no more than, "That fails to address my argument that X", or "Why do you fail to respond to the points that I make above about X?". I have elaborated more here partly because this is a debate about how one should debate, and partly because a number of people here seem to think that a debate can be conducted by (1) ignoring their opponents' reasoned arguments; and (2) repeating their own claims (not substantiated with arguments, and that have been refuted by their opponents' arguments) over and over and over again using increasingly pejorative adjectives in so doing.

I hope that you will now show that you are not impervious to reason (or immensely arrogant, or suffering a defect in imagination, or intellectually dishonest, or irrational), and that you are capable of debating fairly and fully by either (1) accepting that the points that I have made above are, indeed, sound, and that you were, indeed, wrong to assert the contrary in the post in which you claimed that I was intellectually dishonest, arrogant (etc.) for not agreeing with you; or (2) explain, fully and fairly, exactly where you claim that the reasoning that I present above that purports to lead inexorably to that conclusion is flawed, and precisely how you claim that it is flawed.

[quote:wga5s2sc]I do wonder why, if you find these forums so disappointing, you continue to post here and engage people here.[/quote:wga5s2sc]

Because it is imperative to defend what is being unjustly attacked. There is little more odious than unjust criticism.

[quote:wga5s2sc]I also find it strange that the only person you have found insightful is Gwyn -- who is also the only person (through her position as Dean of the SC) who had the power to force you to accept her view by coercion through veto. Your statements here seem to confirm, rather than refute, my concerns.[/quote:wga5s2sc]

Firstly, I did not write that the [i:wga5s2sc]only[/i:wga5s2sc] person whose comments were illuminating was Gwyneth - I wrote that she was "chief amongst them [i.e. those whom I found illuminating]", which entails that there must be others. In fact, if we widen the scope of things about which one might be illuminated to things other than directly relating to the CDS itself, then I have found Rudy Ruml's seminar series to be immensely educative and fascinating.

It is also bizarre that you claim that Gwyneth is the only person who has the power to "force me to accept her view", since, of course, the legislature have the power to pass constitutional amendments abolishing or changing the Judiciary Act, and had the power in the first place not to pass it at all. The other members of the Scientific Council, too, can outvote Gwyneth. In the face of that, what possible substance can the claim that Gwyneth is the [i:wga5s2sc]only[/i:wga5s2sc] person from whom I have learnt, and that she is the [i:wga5s2sc]only[/i:wga5s2sc] person with political power sufficient to defeat what I seek to achieve? Again, in the spirit of the full and fair debate that you advocate, I hope that you will expressly and specifically (and fully and fairly) answer those questions.

[quote:wga5s2sc]With regard to your question why I think irrational means are more capable of providing true answers than is reasoning, I don't. I just don't think that intuition, insight, even passion to some extent, are irrational means. I think we have very good reason not to disregard these methods of interacting with and understanding the world. These reasons can be found in biological psychology, anthropology, even inductive logic.[/quote:wga5s2sc]

Writing where you think that the reasons can be "found" is not the same as stating what the reasons are. What particular reasons (wherever you think that they can be "found") do you have to conclude that one can reliably answer analytic questions truthfully without using reason? Again, in the spirit of full and fair debate, I hope that you give a specific answer to this question, rather than ignoring it, claiming that it is mere "pontification" (providing no reason to believe that it is, indeed, no more than "pontification"), or purporting to answer it by merely repeating the original assertions that gave rise to the question in the first place.

[quote:wga5s2sc]To confine a discussion to deductive analysis is not only impoverished, it is silly because it cannot give us any reason to accept any given starting point or assumption.[/quote:wga5s2sc]

That simply does not make any sense: it is either contradictory, or is a counterargument to an argument that I never made. If you acknowledge that one needs a [i:wga5s2sc]reason[/i:wga5s2sc] to take any given proposition as a starting point, then it necessarily follows that you acknowledge that [i:wga5s2sc]reason[/i:wga5s2sc] is the thing that must be used to distinguish true and false starting points, or else you would say, "We don't need a reason to choose any given starting point: we can choose one quite at random". What counts as a [i:wga5s2sc]reason[/i:wga5s2sc] to choose what you call a "starting point" must, of course, be arrived at by a process of [i:wga5s2sc]reasoning[/i:wga5s2sc]: that is merely definitional.

If your point is that, when I claim that one should use reason, of course, I really mean just what you call "deductive reason", and that, actually, there are lots of other sorts of reason out there, too (such as "inductive reason"), then your point is simply irrelevant, since I was never claiming that one should confine oneself to any given [i:wga5s2sc]subset[/i:wga5s2sc] of reasoning, or specific [i:wga5s2sc]kind[/i:wga5s2sc] of reason, provided that the reasoning is valid, of course. My point was simply that, if one is making any given controversial assertion, one cannot expect anybody else to agree with it (and, indeed, cannot truly honestly believe it at all, and certainly should not act on it) unless one has sufficient [i:wga5s2sc]reason[/i:wga5s2sc] (of any kind) to substantiate that assertion, and, in the case of an argument, that one should state that reason (which necessarily includes the reasons for rejecting what purport to be conclusive counterarguments, if there are any).

[quote:wga5s2sc]This is the primary flaw in your reasoning and your project and your examples (such as the antiharrassment act analyses). You build wondeful structures of reasoned argument. However, you never give us any reason to accept your base assumptions -- and you refuse, without good reason, any attempt to move to the base of your argument to reveal and evaluate these assumptions.[/quote:wga5s2sc]

The precise nature of your complaint here is unclear, since it is not clear what you consider my "base assumptions" to be, exactly. Except for (1) the irreducible components of logic; and (2) sense data, the former of which one must have in common to be able to understand each other enough to know that one disagrees about something at all, and the latter of which can always be communicated in words, all premises of any given line of reasoning are merely conclusions of another line of reasoning. From that, it follows that, given (1) that any given two or more people understand each other enough to know that they disagree about something (and both think that they are disagreeing about the same thing, at least approximately); and (2) that they each have the means to communicate to each other any relevant sense data that the other does not know of, provided that they are both wholly rational and have sufficient intelligence fully to understand the issue, they will both be able to agree given sufficient time. So, unless you think that I am somehow misunderstanding logic itself, or that there is some important sense data (or, in slightly processed form, empirical fact about the world) that necessarily affects my arguments, it cannot be the case that one can simply say that I am starting from the wrong place, and that the problem is not with my reasoning at all, since all that one has to do if one believes that one's opponent is reasoning from a false premise is (1) to identify the premise and (2) either (a) give reasons why it is false; or (b) state that one does not agree with it, and ask for reasons to show that it is true.

However, that has not been the pattern of the debates. When discussing procedural detail, for example, nobody has written, "Aha, that is all well and good, but that all rests on premise X (here is the reasoning to show that it rests on premise X), whereas, actually, premise X is false (for these specific reasons); in fact, premise Y is true (for these specific reasons), and the following argument will show how what I claim about procedure inevitably follows from premise Y, plus some other premises that we both already agree on"; what people have done instead is to write things like, "Can't we be more imaginative than to have detail?", or "That's no good for a frontier", or "But if you have lots of detail, you'll need a lawyer to use the system, and that's bad". Unless the counterarguments actually and specifically address the expressed reason for me having made the claim in the first place, then they are not truly counter-arguments at all.

[quote:wga5s2sc]We cannot protect rights without first having conceptions of them. We cannot prohibit harrassment without having a definition of it. We cannot have good laws, regardless of process, unless we have good legal goals and good content in our substantive laws.

Further, once we have those goals, clear in our mind, we can take any number of roads to get to them. This is why I contend that process is not essential. Any process will do provided it lets us keep our goal in view and move toward it. The problem with the hyperdetailed process, and process-orientation, of Ash's system is that it thwarts this critical purpose. The process distracts us from the substance, such that we lose sight of the substance. No process will work if we lose the substance; any process will work if we keep it in view and have the means to move toward it.[/quote:wga5s2sc]

So, after all that discussion of the nature of debate itself, anybody who has been paying attention will already have a very good idea of what my response to the above is going to be: it simply ignores the specific arguments that I make in favour of detail, and re-states the so-called "insight" (assertion) that has already been made over and over again (and to which I have responded with detailed reasoning to rebut before), viz. that detailed procedures distract from the substance of the law (to protect "rights", although I pause to note that, of course, the law is about far more than just that), and that it does not matter what procedure that one has, provided that the substantive rights are correct.

Firstly, before turning ([i:wga5s2sc]again[/i:wga5s2sc]) to the substance of those claims, I should point out that the argument above implies that my arguments in favour of detailed procedure are arguments about having detailed procedure [i:wga5s2sc]instead[/i:wga5s2sc] of a fully-considered conception of the substantive law. I have, of course, argued no such thing: both procedure and substance is important, and there is nothing about having good procedure that precludes one from having good substance. Indeed, the whole point that I was expressly making in the post above to which Beathan responds is that the procedure is there precisely because the substance is important, and that the procedure is important because of its unique ability to enable the substance to be effective.

Secondly, Beathan claims, "[i:wga5s2sc]any process will do provided it lets us keep our goal in view and move toward it,[/i:wga5s2sc]" yet it is clear that he does not truly believe this, since he goes on in the very next sentence to criticise one particular form of process that he calls "hyperdetailed". So, even Beathan must acknowledge that process is important (or else, why would he care whether the process is detailed or not?).

So, given that the process is important to ensuring that the substantive rights (etc.) are given sufficient effect, the question remains as to what process does that most effectively. Beathan's claim is that detailed process is a "distraction" to substantive rights, whereas I claim the exact opposite: that having a vague process means that one is constantly having to think about how to resolve the vaguenesses, and what the next stage of the procedure should be, rather than knowing exactly what the procedure will be (to the extent that it hardly needs any thought at all, once one has undertaken the one-time task of becoming acquainted with it), leaving one free to concentrate on the substantive aspects of the case. I make the further point that having the right details in procedural rules ensures fairness (and therefore sufficient effect being given to substantive rights, etc.) of a kind that the wrong details cannot, and that one cannot sensibly leave the details of that importance to the discretion of the judge in each case: they must be resolved in advance and applied universally, so important are they.

To assess which of the claims is true, we need to look, of course, to the substance of the matter: which is really easier; which is really more distracting? Are there really any specific details that fairness requires be universal and settled in advance? There are, broadly, two ways of answering these questions: (1) with empirical evidence; and (2) with thought experiments. Both stand in favour of the argument that I make, and against the one that Beathan makes.

Firstly, empirical evidence. Of that, we have two sources: (1) legal proceedings in SecondLife; and (2) legal proceedings in the first life. Starting with the first, there are two memorable sets of legal proceedings in SecondLife: (a) the Ulrika trial; and (b) the StarFleet trial. I have read the transcripts of substantial parts of both. In relation to the first, Gwyneth points out that twenty hours or so was spent on that case, most of them working out what the procedures should be. Only a small amount of the time was spent on deciding the substance of the matter. The main criticisms made of the trial were procedural: that there was no jury (despite the constitution purporting at the time to require that all trials should be held with a jury), that the process was inquisitorial, rather than adversarial, and so forth. There can be little doubt that it was the lack of procedures that were a distraction in that case. Turning to the StarFleet trial (on which our own Ludo Merit was a juror), although I had, in advance, and without knowing anything of the facts of the case (deliberately), given the person who was to be the judge an unavoidably brief run-down of how an English criminal trial works, the trial was still dogged by procedural confusion, chief amongst which, identified by Ludo herself, was that despite the fact that I had outlined the workings of an English criminal trial (because that was all that I knew enough about to be able to explain), many of the participants, including the judge, assumed that certain American rules applied, so that, for example, the judge did not give the parties an opportunity to address him in mitigation after conviction, but also did not give the jury any directions about the different degrees of offence that they might find proved. The judge, inexperienced in legal proceedings, made other mistakes, too, such as not having a written indictment, or making any summing up to the jury (directing them on what they had to find proved in order to convict, etc.). That again all obfuscated, rather than clarified, the court's ability to address the substantive merits of the issue, viz. of what degree of offence that the defendant was guilty (if the American system be used), or whether the judge should sentence the defendant on his own basis of plea, or on the prosecution's more serious version of events, and in any vent how the judge should exercise his sentencing discretion (if the English system be used). Instead, the process was entirely side-tracked into lengthy arguments about whether lines of questioning were relevant to guilt or innocence (when, in substance, the defendant was not even arguing that he was entirely innocent), and, in turn, whether the judge was biased in disallowing certain evidence on the basis that it was irrelevant to the question of guilt.

Turning to empirical evidence from the real world, I practice predominantly (but not exclusively) in crime, often prosecuting in the lower (magistrates') courts, in which I often only receive my papers an hour or so before the hearing starts (they are invariably relatively simple cases, but relatively simple is not the same as absolutely simple). Despite that, because I know exactly how the procedure works, and can rely on it being exactly the same in each case (the prosecution makes a brief opening speech, calls each witness, examines that witness in chief with non-leading questions, lets the witness be cross-examined, possibly, but usually not, asks some questions in re-examination, indicates that the case is closed, then cross-examines the defendant (if called) and any defence witnesses, and replies to the defence closing speech if there are any errors of law that need correcting, always in accordance with standard rules of procedure, evidence and court etiquette), I can prepare the case satisfactorily in that time, concentrating only on the evidence and how each disputed element may be proved, and how the defendant's claims may be refuted, without having to work out afresh each time what the procedure might be.

More generally, court cases are heard all the time up and down the country, both in civil and criminal courts, and, indeed, all over the world, and, because everyone knows what the procedure is in advance, there is usually far less argument about the procedure (because there isn't anything to argue about: it is all settled) and far more argument about the substance.

Turning to thought experiments and to the other reason that detail is important: to ensure that rights (etc.) are, indeed, adequately safeguarded: suppose that A sues B. Obviously, B must have a right to know that somebody is asking the court to make an order against her or him, and to respond to that. So, we must have rules that make sure that either A, or the court, or both, let B know of the action against her or him. Then, B must be given a reasonable time to respond, and put her or his own case, but, at the same time, he or she cannot be allowed to defeat A's claim by simply doing nothing (because that would mean that claims would be determined otherwise than on their merits), so we need a time limit within which B can respond. Suppose that B has in her or his possession some information (say, in the form of notecards) directly relevant to the case, but that helps A's case, and harms B's: should B be allowed to keep them secret, or must B disclose them to A? Again, if the case is to be determined on its merits, A should generally be allowed to see the documents, so we need rules of disclosure (or discovery as it is sometimes called). Then, suppose that some facts are in dispute between A and B, and the court would make a different order if one set of facts were preferred over the other; how should the court go about resolving those facts? Should the judge become a private investigator and make her or his own investigations? Or is it better to require the parties to present their evidence in open court, and let the other party challenge it? We need a rule to tell us which of these models is used. In what order should things be done in court? If there is a dispute of fact, who presents her or his evidence first? Who gets the final word? How many times may each party address the court? Do people stand up or sit down to address the court? May people speak at once, or only one at a time? How do we tell who should speak? May somebody interrupt? If we are to have proceedings where people understand what to expect and know what is going on, we need rules to answer all of those questions. What if a judge delivers a judgment containing an error, missing out the word "not", for example, purely by accident, and changing the whole meaning - can the judge change it, or is it binding for ever? If the judge can change it, when may it be changed? The same day? The same week? Two weeks later? A year later? Can the judge change it back again? These questions, too, need answering with rules. Suppose that a party wants to appeal: what should the appeal court do: hold the whole hearing again? Or just see whether the court below made any identifiable errors of reasoning, whether it made a decision that a reasonable court could have made in the circumstances? Should it allow all appeals to go to a full hearing, or should it throw out at an early stage appeals that obviously have no merit? What if the decision being appealed is an interim decision of the court below: what happens to the main action? What can a court do if the appeal is obviously one that is just meant to delay proceedings? All of these questions, and many, many more besides need answering with rules if (1) the fairness of the proceedings is to be assured; and (2) the parties are to be left free to concentrate on substance, rather than the procedure itself.

[quote:wga5s2sc]This error in thought is also responsible for Ash's mistaken and unpopular rejection of the UDHR as substantive law in the CDS. Ash argues, the UDHR is too vague to provide for good procedural analysis. Perhaps, but it is good enough to serve as a purposive definition of a substantive law of civil rights in the CDS. That is its historical function in the CDS -- and it is a proper one.[/quote:wga5s2sc]

I have never argued that the UDHR is too vague for a "procedural analysis", whatever that means, since the UDHR does not purport to prescribe any procedures. My argument is, as I have expanded, and will further expand elsewhere, that the UDHR is [i:wga5s2sc]substantively[/i:wga5s2sc] vague, and was [i:wga5s2sc]never designed to be treated as a source of law[/i:wga5s2sc], as opposed to an important policy objective, and should not, therefore, be treated as one, as, to do so is likely to cause serious problems, some of which undermine the very policy goals (the rights to democratic participation and to a fair and effective legal system) that the UDHR provides for in the first place.

[quote:wga5s2sc]I do wonder, reading both these stories, why anyone needed either an architect or an accountant. Things were working fine before professional intervention.[/quote:wga5s2sc]

That is not the impression that I get from having talked to Gwyn about the Ulrika trial.

[quote:wga5s2sc]I see no reason to believe that Connie and Neuf -- or the frontier folks -- could not have worked out their problems for themselves as they came up in ways that did not disrupt their lives to the extent found in either story.[/quote:wga5s2sc]

So the co-operative people would have got along just fine with the Administration department not keeping any records and bungling the accounts together after the fact by several degrees of approximation, would they?

[quote:wga5s2sc]Frontier folks are simple, practical folks -- but they don't need paternalistic intervention from the "civilized world" for that reason. They do just fine. In other words, Country ain't dumb.[/quote:wga5s2sc]

We, of course, are not "frontier folks", since we have never left our largely urban first lives to come to SecondLife: unlike the frontier metaphor that you so often use, we are not migrants going from living one life to another, but people who add a "second life" to their first. So, you can speak for yourself when you claim that those in SecondLife are "simple folk"; many of us are not.

[quote:wga5s2sc]The fact is that systems, especially complicated systems, that evolved in a certain social or historical context are particularly well suited to that context. This leads to the illusion that they are superior systems -- because they work so well where they evolved. However, this just means that they are uniquely suited to their context -- not that they are transferrable. In fact, they rarely are transferrable - and rarely work better in a new context than a more primitive system that evolves in the new context on its own. By incorporating RL law -- whether British or American or Orinoco Tribal -- we are trying to fit a round, or oval, or triangular peg in our square hole. I would rather have a well-fitted wooden peg for the hole than the most gilded round one.[/quote:wga5s2sc]

Making a metaphor does not mean that you are right: you still need [i:wga5s2sc]reasons[/i:wga5s2sc] to establish your claim that the fact of detailed procedure really is a round peg, and that our hole really is square. Do you have such reasons, that address the specific reasons that I give above, and will you, in the spirit of a full and fair debate, either (1) give those reasons fully and fairly; or (2) admit, fully and fairly, that you have no such reasons, and that you should not, therefore, have claimed what you have?

Ashcroft Burnham

Where reason fails, all hope is lost.
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