Beathan,
Please check [u:3ukuupap]Ardito[/u:3ukuupap] v. [u:3ukuupap]City of Providence[/u:3ukuupap], United States District Court, District of Rhode Island, 2003, 263 F.Supp.2d 358.
In 2001, the City of Providence, Rhode Island, decided to begin hiring police officers to fill vacancies in its police department. Because only individuals who had graduated from the Providence Police Academy were eligible, the city also decide to conduct two training sessions, the "60th and 61st Police Academies". To be admitted, an applicant had to pass a series of tests and be deemeed qualified by members of the department after an interview. The applicants judged most qualified were sent a letter informing them that they had been selected to attend the academy if they successfully completed a medical checkup and a psychological examination. The letter to the applicants to the 61st Academy, dated October 15, stated that it was "a conditional offer of employment". Meanwhile, a new Chief of Police, Dean Esserman, decided to revise the selection process, which caused some of those who had received the letter to be rejected. Derek Ardito and thirteen other newly rejected applicants -who had all completed the examinations- filed a suit in a federal district court against the city, seeking a halt to the 61st Academy unless hey were allowed to attend. They alleged in part that the city as in breach of contract.
Ernest C. Torres, Chief District Judge, stated as follows:
"The city argues that there is no contract b etween the parties because the plaintiffs have no legally enforceable right to employment. The city correctly points out that, even if the plaintiffs graduate from the Academy and there are existing vacancies in the department, they would be required to serve a one-year probationary period during which they could be terminated without cause... "
E.C. Torres, CDJ, held that:
"That argument misses the point. The contract that the plaintiffs seek to enforce is not contract that they will be appointed as permanent Providence police officers; rather, it is a contract that they would be admitted to the Academy if they passed the medical and psychological examinations".
The court issued an injunction to prohibit the city from conducting the 61st Police Academy unless the plaintiffs were included. The October 15 letter was a unilateral offer that the plaintiffs had accepted by passing the required medical and psychological examinations.
In our case, the Judicial Application Questionnaire is preceded by a header stating as follows:
"Questionnaire to be completed by applicants for qualification as a Judge of Common Jurisdiction in the Confederation of Democratic Simulators." In the section entitled "Guidance on completing this questionnaire" the application further states that:
"The deadline for applications is the 29th of November 2006".
As we know, the deadline was duly extended to the 8th of December 2006.
Just as for the applicants who, in [u:3ukuupap]Ardito[/u:3ukuupap] v. [u:3ukuupap]City of Providence[/u:3ukuupap] ("[u:3ukuupap]Ardito[/u:3ukuupap]), were sent the October 15th letter, were in effect made an unilateral offer they accepted by passing the required medical and psychological examinations, so in our case the application questionnaire is a unilateral offer that, as long as submitted within the appropriate time-frame, would have to be considered for their suitabilty to become Judges of Common Jurisdiction and, if so deemed suitable, have a chance to be selected as Judges of Common Jurisdiction by the PJSP or, in its absence, the RA.
Just as the new Chief of Police breached the terms of this contract by revising the selection process after the applicants received the October 15 letter and so disqualified 14 applicants previously qualified to attend the 61st Police Academy as long as they passed their medical and psychological tests, in the same way the RA would be in breach of its contract with all applicants who, having submitted their completed applications by the 8th of December 2006 deadline, would be disqualified from being considered as suitable to become Judges of Common Jurisdiction and deprived of their right, if so selected, to be considered to be chosen for the position above by the PJSP or, if neccessary, the RA.
It is important to note that, whilst all individuals in [u:3ukuupap]Alito[/u:3ukuupap] received a letter dated October 15, each of them could have taken their medical and psychological tests both before and after the Chief of Police's decision to revise the selection process. This fact was irrelevant to the decision in this case, since all applicants who had received the October 15 letter and passed their tests but were disqualified due to the change mentioned above were ordered to be included in the 61st Police Academy.
In our case, the date when two or more applicants become CDS citizens is irrelevant as long as they submit their application for qualification as Judges of Common Jurisdiction in the CDS by the required deadline. Once they do so, CDS is contractually obliged to submit their applications to the PJSP (or, if required, the RA) irrespective of the time when the RA may revise the criteria of the selection process -as long as they pass the intial, suitability test required for the position. To do otherwise, and distinguish between similarly qualified applicants based not on the date of submission of the application, but on the date of selection by the PJSP (or thr RA, as may be) would constitute a similar breach off contract by the CDS as that of the Police Department in [u:3ukuupap]Alito[/u:3ukuupap].
Alternatively, I submit that the latest possible date after which CDS can no longer reject suitable applicants for consideration by the PJSP (or the RA, as may be) is the date on which they are deemed to be suitable to become Judges of Common Jurisdiction and are sent written confirmation thereof by the Chief Justice. In no case whatsoever can the date of the final selection for the position of Judge of Common Jurisdiction by the PJSP (or the RA, as may be) can be considered the moment until which the RA is capable of revising the criteria of the selection process without breaching its contract with the applicants who qualified before such revisions, but not after them, to have their applications submitted for consideration to the PJSP (or the RA, as may be).
Beathan, I have justified my position at length in order to make it clear what the legal requirements are in this situation from a purely contractual point of view (and withhold for later, if necessary, the constitutional and human rights arguments). You may well disagree with me, but you will not be able to persuade me that my analysis is flawes unless you provide me with admissible, relevant and higher authority on the issues addressed above.